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		 In generalized exchanges, as in other domains, the extension of the circuit of 
legitimization (A talks about B’s property, who talks about C’s property, etc.) trans-
forms the nature of domination by producing spheres of social influence with dimen-
sions too vast to be completely controlled by specific social agents.  It institutes a 
division of labor of the dominate influences that is much more efficient than other 
controls which are too centralized, too visible, and too restrictive to last….This en-
larged exchange tends to replace explicit censorship with self-censorship, which of-
ten has to be accepted and recognized, and initiates submission to the anonymous 
rules of social order.  What we call “generalized domination” by analogy is this new 
mode of domination which tends to proliferate.  Today, the dominant classes are 
strongly differentiated.  Each fraction dominates the others to a minor extent and is, 
simultaneously, greatly dependent on them as a whole.  Among the dominant fac-
tions, none dominates everything. The one faction which dominates at any given time 
is a singular configuration of different fields (camps) participating in power sharing.
　　　　　　 （Patrick Champagne, Faire l’opinion: Le nouveaux jeu politique, Paris: 
Éditions de Minuit, 1990, pp. 276-277. Translated by the author.)  
		 How could a democracy so suddenly turn itself into an effective war economy? 
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The answer may lie in something fundamental to free societies.  Aristotle saw it way 
back then.  How can a tyrant hope to perpetuate himself in power, he asked?  And 
he gave a most peculiar-sounding answer.  The tyrant must keep all men of ability 
(arete) ‘hanging about the palace gates’ and he must ban all symposia, those drinking 
and social clubs where men of any standing met in the long siesta for talk, refresh-
ment, and whatever.  Why? Well, to keep them hanging about is to keep an eye on 
them ―  marked men ―  and to keep them from conspiring.  But why ban innocent 
symposia?  Because it is in such non-political institutions that men first learn mu-
tual trust. And without mutual trust there can be no overthrow of tyranny.  I think 
the superior mobilization of the British war economy was because people trusted 
each other, decisions could be developed, and people could work together on that 
basis to fulfill central plans but without constant central monitoring.  (This is an art 
that outside times of emergency we do not now always sustain ―  having plenty of 
time to work out elaborate devices of accountability and monitoring to ensure that 
public servants do their jobs, which in fact interfere with them doing their jobs when 
trust has diminished that they can do so from their own sense of professional 
duty.)….In democracies not merely can trust be greater because omniscience is not 
expected but also because the fruits of failure are less drastic; people will trust their 
arm, trust their own judgment, exercise initiative.…Just as the desire for revenge 
can run contrary to the need for political compromise, so mutual trust is .… a basic 
condition for political action, and somehow one finds more of that in democracies 
than in autocracies.
　　　　　　　　　　　	(Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.102-103.)
Introduction
Following the Plaza Accord of 1985, industrial rearrangement（overseas local 
production, overseas procurement of parts）in Japan, fostered by the strong 
yen-caused recession, propelled the industrialization of other Asian countries. 
Japan led the NIES countries (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), 
which were then followed by China.  This kind of development was called a 
“staggered economic development.”  During the 1980s, Asian countries aimed at 
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export-led industrialization under military or soft authoritarian regimes, and 
attained economic growth with the introduction of foreign capital.  In the late 
80s, massive street demonstrations against heavy-handed politics led, in 1986, to 
the demise of Marcos’ autocratic regime in the Philippines, lifted martial law in 
Taiwan in 1987, after an interval of about forty years, and led to regime transi-
tions to democracy in Korea and Thailand in 1992.  Putting aside the question 
of the degree of “Wave” in each country, “The Third Wave” of democratization 
led many Asian countries to establish an “electoral” democracy with guarantees 
of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and of human rights.
	 In Asian socialist countries as well, the process of democratization began 
with the introduction of market economies.  In Vietnam, the Doi Moi policy 
(“external open policy”), which had begun in 1986, started to pick up momentum 
and, encouraged by economic growth, allowed for disclosure of information 
there. 
	 China went through a transitional period to a market economy after the 
decision was made in 1978 to adopt open economic policies, and to implement the 
“Socialist Market Economy” policy of 1992.  China’s economy has grown in near 
double-digit figures for most of the past two decades.  Having outgrown stag-
nated state-owned enterprises, private enterprises have become a plinth of 
power and grown supporting the Chinese Communist Party (“state”).  Contra-
dictions inherent in a combination of the one-party system and the market 
economy have given birth to myriad types of social organizations (“civil soci-
ety”).  After abolishing the people’s commune and restoring county-town gover-
nance, the CCP established institutions in direct support of the people’s repre-
sentatives.  In the late 1980s, direct elections took place at the county and local 
levels where the people elected members of their village to self-governing orga-
nizations, namely, “the villagers’ committees,” to control corrupt exchanges in-
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volving rural party cadres, and to mitigate discontent among the villagers (See 
Khorogi, 2002, pp. 153-154). 1  In April 1989, we finally witnessed the massive 
street demonstrations of the Beijing Spring, the Tiananmen Incident, which 
many intellectuals, and the urban masses, supported. 
	 Wang Hui, an eminent Chinese scholar, describes the great change in 
China after the Tiananmen Incident as follows: “In 1989, the social movement 
attempted to facilitate an organic interaction between state and society via mass 
participation, but after 1989 the mechanism of interaction between state and 
market came to substitute for those between state and society.  As part of this 
historical process, the concept of society was gradually replaced by the concept 
of the market and the basic motivating power behind the promotion of the trans-
formation of the mechanism of the state and the reform of the legal system was 
no longer ‘society,’ but internal and external markets.  As a result, the very 
implications of the term ‘politics’ underwent a huge shift: the state became the 
defender of the market mechanism and the principal administrator of the legal 
system along lines set out by the WTO”（Hui, 2003, p. 199）.
	 According to James Petras, an American radical sociologist, “Two Chinas” 
―  the coastal region and the interior ―  appeared within this self-denying so-
cialism.  Almost all of the foreign-owned or managed enterprises are concen-
trated in the coastal economic zones.  At best, the interior provides a source of 
cheap labor and a declining share of food and raw materials.  Since joining the 
WTO, the entire process of accumulation, reproduction and distribution in China 
has been directed, owned and benefits an extremely limited class of foreign and 
domestic capitalists and Chinese state directors and their extended family net-
works.  Petras harshly criticizes the present conditions in China: “The extreme 
and growing class inequality in power, wealth, ownership, access to state credit, 
contracts, licenses, incentives and land concessions is totally mystified by refer-
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ences to ‘China’ invests, grows….etc” (Petras, 2007, p. 147).
	 The existing mode of a society is determined by the structure of inter-
regulations among state institutions, the political society, the civic society, and 
the corporate economy, which are configured singularly by combinations of 
functions of rationalization (the “bureaucratic” phase), representation and par-
ticipation (the “democratic” phase), and accumulation (the “capitalist” phase).
	 Efforts towards democratization in Asian countries have sought the devel-
opment of a pluralization of political societies and a route to inclusive “represen-
tation and participation” that opposes the exclusiveness of state organizations by 
invigorating opposition parties, social movements, and civil society organiza-
tions, including the NGO and NPO.  To democratize autocratic and develop-
ment-oriented authoritarian regimes that take precedence over “rationalization” 
and “accumulation”, leads to a test of strength of “representation and participa-
tion” embedded in civil society. 2
	 Dieter Senghaas states that the pluralization of political systems which can 
be observed in East Asia today, is a political reflection of the institutional adap-
tation of old autocratic and despotic regimes to an increasingly complex socio-
economic and cultural reality.  Its direction is not liner but irregular.  But its 
prospects are good, according to Senghaas, “because it was preceded by a re-
grouping of the old societies into strong new socio-economic groups” (Senghaas, 
2002, pp. 112-113). In that Asia today, this adaptation has witnessed discontent-
ment among the poorer people living in the urban peripheries and in rural areas 
with imbalanced social-economic development（the phenomenon of ‘two Chinas’）
caused by rapid economic globalization, and has amplified the psycho-societal 
characteristics of the “non-place” fostered by self-reflective modernization.
	 This paper is an essay on an analytical framework for comparing democra-
cies in Asian countries by observing civil societies interacting with state organi-
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zations, political societies and the corporate economy, and by utilizing the con-
cepts of “social capital” and “trust,” keeping in mind the “mode of connection” 
within the traits of democracy (representativeness, legitimacy, and responsive-
ness).  “Social capital,” as used by sociologists James S. Coleman and Pierre 
Bourdieu with a primary focus on education, has become an influential concept 
across a variety of disciplines through two influential books by American politi-
cal scientist Robert D. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000).  “Trust” is to be treated as a trait of “social capital” and in-
cludes more historical/relational elements than just trust/distrust as measured 
by polls.
	 In reexamining this dimension, this paper tries to marshal arguments over 
“social capital,” and “trust” before and after Putnam’s work ―  especially Mak-
ing Democracy Work (1993).  Through this work, this essay seeks to clarify the 
logic and structure of connecting the “social” dimension with the “political” one 
(e.g., political trust, mode of democratic involvement), bearing in mind Asian 
countries as much as possible.
1　Social	Exchange	and	Social/Political	Relationship
Electioneering under polyarchial regimes is institutionalized as political compe-
tition over the right to govern between governments and political opponents. 
By contrast, in developing countries, elections easily become formalistic and 
ritualistic.  Political tensions between the state and society can be compounded 
because of dissent among the defeated over the electoral process, the results, 
and the electoral system as well.
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	 In Korea, it is well-known that elections have turned strong regionalism 
into an important force for controlling changes in government personnel.  In 
Southeast Asian countries (especially in Thailand and the Philippines), many 
researchers have observed patron-client relationships helping the bigwigs to 
patronize public policies (See Scott, 1969; Scott, 1972).  And we have repeatedly 
witnessed a kind of “politics of personality” in which integrative leaders mobilize 
the poor masses. There is no small number of countries which have areas in the 
peripheries teeming with anti-regime oriented religions, ethnic movements and 
small parties isolated and alienated from the established power structure.
Exchange 
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instrumental   
benefits) 
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expressive 
benefits) 
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Exchange 
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Figure Ⅷ-1　Social	Exchange	and	Clientelism
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	 By referring to Italian political scientist Luigi Graziano’s thesis on clien-
telism which is based on the theory of social exchange, this paper attempts to 
shed some light on the “representation and participation” process and the con-
junctive nature of civil and political societies in Asian countries that are charac-
terized by a contradictory mixing of tradition, modernity, and post-modernity.
	  While using Peter M. Blau’s exchange theory (Blau, 1964) (see Figure Ⅷ
-1) as a base, Graziano regarded “clientelism” as a kind of dyadic, direct ex-
change.  Peter Blau understands that a basic difference exists between associa-
tions that are considered by their participants as ends in themselves, and those 
that are considered as a means to some further ends.  Graziano contrasts an 
“ideology” based on the former associations (“intrinsic benefits”) which, in prin-
ciple, are inseparable from the association which procures them, against an ex-
change based on the latter associations (“extrinsic benefits”), which are those 
separable from the association.
	 Excluding “expressive friendship” (which is intrinsically rewarding) and 
“Wertrational action” (in the Max Weber sense) from the concept of social ex-
change, Graziano separated social exchange into “direct exchange” and “indirect 
exchange.”  According to him, direct exchange is based on “an exchange of im-
mediate, individual, predominantly material rewards.”  The subordinate com-
plies with the superior’s commands and the activist with the leader’s directives 
in exchange for the services which they receive directly from the authority or 
from the leader.  By contrast, indirect exchange is based on “a horizontal control 
exerted by the very subordinates (or members of a group) who offer collective 
compliance with the directives of the superior in exchange for his contribution 
to the welfare of the group” (Graziano, 1975, p. 36).
Amoral Clientelism
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	 Edward C. Banfield explains the problems of South Italy in his famous book 
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958).  Through 
participatory observation (for nine months in 1954 and 1955), Banfield observed 
many facets of the peasantry in Montegrano (A small Basilicata village ―  the 
name is fictitious.), which is typical of the south, namely “the rest of Lucania, 
the regions of Abruzzi and Calabria, the interior of Campania, and the coasts of 
Catania, Messina, Palermo, and Trapani.”
	 Using data from census schedules and other official sources, from record 
books, from interviews, and from Thematic Apperception Tests, Banfield 
achieved clear insights into the ethos of the peasantry.  He astutely referred to 
this area as a society hoisted by “amoral familism.”  Local residents did not 
know about voluntary associations.  Assuming that all others will do likewise, 
each individual will act to maximize the material, short-term advantages of the 
nuclear family.
	 Amoral familists did not show much interest in public affairs, assumed that 
there would be few checks on officials (for checking on officials would be the 
business of other officials only) and presumed that whatever group was in 
power would be self-serving and corrupt.  They did not engage in collective ac-
tion or collaborative enterprises that would highlight their political incapacities.
	 Being similar to Banfield’s assumption, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney 
Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1963), pictured Italian political cul-
ture as that of “relatively unrelieved political alienation and of social isolation 
and distrust”  (Also see LaPalombara, 1965; Barnes and Sani, 1974). According 
to Banfiled, in Southern Italy “amoral” familism retarded the growth of volun-
tary associations and did not allow for the introduction and development of “a 
sense of community” and civic culture.  The findings of The Civic Culture (1963) 
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suggested that such a society kept a “sense of civic competence” and “civic co-
operation” at a low level, made the modes of political participation clientelistic, 
and suffocated effective democracy. 
Civic Community
	 As opposed to Italian political culture, Almond and Verba (1963) pictured 
the American and English ones as civic.  Saint Jones (a small town in Utah, 
USA) where Banfield had also conducted research during the same period, 
though separately from Montegrano, showed that a pluralistic civic society 
abounds in networks of sociability and voluntary associations, and is supported 
by “enlightened self-interest.”
	 It is Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993) that reveals civic 
communities in the center and north of Italy.  According to Putnam, such civic 
regions are characterized by a dense network of local associations, by active 
engagement in community affairs, by trust, by law-abidingness, and by egalitar-
ian patterns of politics which deploy “indirect exchanges” (in Graziano’s term) in 
many spheres of civic activity.
	 The South, by contrast, is characterized by poverty and economic back-
wardness where we often observe clientelistic exchanges led by “amoral fa-
milism.”  There, the concept of “citizen” has been less than easy to develop. 
Civic engagement within social and cultural associations has been scarce and, 
with a fear of trasformismo, the powerful have been looked up to as respectable 
patrons.  It would be no wonder to find out that the performances of local gov-
ernments in the South don’t compare with those in north-central Italy.
Virtuous Clientelism
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	 Italian political scientist Simona Piattoni’s Il Clientelismo: L’Italia in pros-
pettiva comparata (Roma: Carocci editore, 2005), while viewing clientelism as a 
political strategy for gaining and maintaining power, and emphasizing “politics” 
as the interaction of the strategies of both patrons and clients, discovered a 
variety of “styles of clientelistic government” that, although superficially similar, 
nevertheless work according to rather different logics, and, as a result of cul-
tural and structural factors, produce different outcomes in terms of economic 
development in the undeveloped and incivic “South,” just as Banfield (1958) and 
Almond and Verba (1963) had discovered. 
	 Piattoni endeavors to answer why Abruzzo, sustaining the growth spurt of 
the 1970s, managed to weather the crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s more suc-
cessfully than Puglia, although similarly positioned at the beginning of the 
1970s.  Her research found that the different results depended on the ability of 
their respective local political classes to help the local economy tackle the neces-
sary restructuring.  The key element is “politics.” That is, the different political 
strategies of local elites.  In Abruzzo, the politician（the patron）is cohesive and 
competitive, and the electorate (the client) is also strong.  The “social contract”-
oriented exchange of benefits between patrons and clients became practicable 
through the allocation of community-oriented “pork-barrel”-type resources 
(“clientelismo virtuoso”).  In Abruzzo, cohesive patrons facing strong opposition 
could foster economic development and effectively deliver actual goods to the 
local community.  In contrast to this, Puglia’s combination of divided patrons 
and weak clients made it hard for less cohesive patrons to attract resources from 
the center and to allocate them effectively in the periphery (“clientelismo inef-
ficace”).  “Isolated and atomized clients demanded selective goods for their ex-
clusive individual benefit.”  According to Piattoni, only a “virtuous patron” 
would be interested in, and capable of, credibly enforcing contracts and promot-
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ing economic development. 
	 Piattoni viewed the logic of “politics” (e.g., the political strategies of the lo-
cal elite) as a precondition for the diffusion of collective structures of interaction, 
alongside the dyadic structures that prevail in the private sphere, ensuring that, 
“in their public dealings, individuals learn to base their behavior on deferred 
rewards and general principles rather than on immediate rewards” (Piattoni, 
1998, p. 229).  She suggested that economic development can feed back to poli-
tics, contributing to the replacement of clientelism by a more “civic” style of 
politics (Piattoni, 1998, p. 239).
	 Piattoni, comparing between the “southern and southern,” found that 
“politics” was a great driving force for transforming “amoral familism” into a 
“civic community” by fostering indirect exchange.  Basing his ideas on the game 
theory, Robert Putnam, who, according to Piattoni could be categorized as a 
social structuralist or culturalist (like Banfield and Almond and Verba) when 
belittling politics, explains the bifurcation of the Italian North-South by con-
trasting the self-reinforcing relationships between individuals and their envi-
ronments from the perspective of path-dependent social equilibrium ―  “civic” 
society in the center and north with abundant social capital and “incivic” society 
in the south. 
2　Social	Capital
Robert Putnam
	 Robert Putnam used the term “social capital” to refer to “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency 
of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993a, p. 167).  The 
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quantity of social capital in a region or a community, determines the method of 
resolving dilemmas of collective action and the efficiency of social management 
there.
	 The North, says Putnam, fought its way from barbarous conditions with 
“horizontal collaboration” and succeeded in building and accumulating “social 
capital” which made civic cooperation and solidarity possible, and developed the 
concept of impersonal contracts and mutual trust.  This led to an affluent civic 
community there.  The South, by contrast, developed a “vertical hierarchy” of 
dependence and exploitation, and underwent a Hobbesian solution to dilemmas 
of collective action through authoritarian government, patron-clientelism, extra-
legal “enforcers,” and the like. 
	 Putnam’s theory of social capital is influenced by Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
“science of voluntary association” and Almond and Verba’s concept of “civic co-
operation,” and it becomes the “normative” theory of civic culture embracing 
autonomy and fraternity based on ideas like civic virtue, civic engagement (ac-
tive involvement in public affairs), norms of reciprocity among equals, and mu-
tual trust/cooperation.
Putnam and Related Theses : James S. Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu
	 According to Richard M. Carpiano, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
conceptualizes social capital beyond concepts of trust and norms of reciprocity, 
and necessitates consideration of more tangible network-based resources that 
people exploit for action.  So, it is assumed that the benefits of social capital do 
not go beyond the community at large, including the free-riders of Putnam’s 
supposition (Carpiano, 2008, p. 84).  Such a viewpoint is shared by the prominent 
American sociologist, James S. Coleman.  Coleman, similarly to Bourdieu, de-
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rived his theses of “social capital” from doing research into the factors that 
cause great differences in the educational achievements of students.
	 James Coleman had a significant influence over the reparation and integra-
tion processes in elementary and secondary education after World War II, 
through leading three large-scale surveys conducted by the Federal Govern-
ment.  In 1981, after the Second Report (1975) which was condemned for over-
turning his argument for the integration of education, he carried out a large-
scale survey of public and private schools.
	 The so-called “Third Report,” Longitudinal Data Analysis, and the follow-
ing, High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared, 
showed that the differences in scholastic achievement between public schools 
and private schools was due not to the content of their curriculums ―  the “un-
structured curriculum,” and the degree of cultural literacy which the “Back to 
the Basics” schools emphasized ―  but to the different degree of “social capital” 
which was accumulated, and utilize by students, in each type of school.  The 
religiously based high schools are surrounded by a community based on a reli-
gious organization.  “These families have intergenerational closure that is based 
on a multiplex relation: whatever other relations they have, the adults are mem-
bers of the same religious body and parents of children in the same school” 
(Coleman, 1988, p. 114).  
	 Utilizing networks of relatedness cultivated by trust and the norms of reci-
procity, and fostered by “closure,” children begin to study harder with high 
achievements.  By contrast, “it is the independent private schools that are typi-
cally least surrounded by a community, for their student bodies are collections 
of students, most of whose families have no contact.  The choice of private school 
for most of these parents is an individualistic one, and, although they back their 
children with expensive human capital, they send their children to these schools 
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denuded of social capital” (Coleman, 1988, p. 114).
	 In Coleman’s view, the function identified by the concept “social capital” is 
“the value of those aspects of social structure to actors, as resources that can be 
used by the actors to realize their interests” (Coleman, 1990, p. 305).  And, indi-
vidual actors in a social system “differ with respect to the extent of credit slips 
on which they can draw at any time” (Coleman, 1990, p. 308).  The extent of 
“outstanding obligations,” according to Coleman, depends on a variety of factors 
and includes: “besides the general level of trustworthiness that leads obligations 
to be repaid, the actual needs that persons have for help, the existence of other 
sources of aid (such as governmental welfare services), cultural differences in 
the tendency to lend aid and ask for aid, the degree of closure of social networks, 
logistics of social contacts” (Coleman, 1990, p. 307).
	 For Coleman, social capital is accumulated as “outstanding credit slips” 
through social exchange, not, as in the case of money, through economic ex-
change.  It is not by chance that his attention to the “emergent properties” of 
social relations, that is, of social forms as structures independent of the indi-
viduals who originate them (Graziano, 1975, p. 18), had already appeared in his 
initial work on community conflict (Coleman, 1957).
	 As Coleman realized, European society, in which Pierre Bourdieu had ana-
lyzed the differences in scholastic ability in relation to “social capital”, is so-
cially plural and schools are usually linked to the associative networks embedded 
in social factors such as social class, religion, and ethnicity (Coleman, 1956; Cole-
man, 1957).
	 Running approximately parallel to Coleman’s analysis of educational in-
equality, Bourdieu’s definition of social capital is strongly linked to the notion 
that power offers resources to particular group members as a result of a given 
network.  Social capital is defined as the aggregate of “the actual or potential 
（214）
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition….which 
provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital” 
(Bourdieu, 1997 (1983), pp. 248-249).
	 For Bourdieu, social capital is easily united with “systems of disposition,” 
namely the “habitus” which engender attitudes and conduct that enable “objec-
tive” structuring, such as material conditions for existence, characteristic of 
some groups or classes, and socially structured conditions that enable life to 
succeed and reproduce.  As described by Bourdieu (1980), social capital is sub-
ordinate to “all institutions which work to the advantage of legitimate exchang-
es and try to exclude illegitimate exchanges,” “attracts markedly vigorous ho-
mogeneous, if at all possible, individuals suitable for the existence and survival 
of the group in all its respects, and engenders decent exchanges (rallying, cruis-
ing, hunting, evening parties, receptions, etc.), occasions (upper class districts, 
elite schools, clubs, etc.), and practices (fashionable sport, clubby indoor games, 
and cultural ceremonies, etc.).”  It contributes to reproducing the high “mortal-
ity from schooling” in France (See also Bourdieu et Passeron, 1964; Bourdieu et 
Passeron, 1970).
	 Social capital is produced by strategic social investment based on the recip-
rocal exchange of resources and accesses through mutual acquaintance or rec-
ognition.  For Bourdieu, who thinks that economic capital is at the root of all 
other types of capital, social capital is a mere disguise for economic capital, 
largely functioning as something essential for building up economic capital and 
social status ―  getting in the way of the reproduction of class relations.  Shige-
to Sonoda regards the managerial stratum working for state organizations as 
the people who most greatly benefit from the policies of openness and reform. 
He continues as follows: “They obtain political powers as well as cultural capital, 
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as suggested by the high ratio of university graduates among them.  In 2006, 
they became the top group for average monthly incomes.  Their gaining of eco-
nomic resources gives them the appearance of monopolizing social resources in 
China.  Observations about changes in some eight years make it clear that the 
core pillar of the Communist Party is steadily achieving affluence” (Sonoda, 
2008, p. 171. Translated by the author.).  
	 If Bourdieu were alive, how would he explain this situation in terms of “so-
cial capital?”  As Lin notes, “it is clear that Bourdieu considers these forms of 
capital as largely in the hands of the dominant class, since it occupies the top 
positions in society” (Lin, 2001, p. 15). 
Social Capital as Social Network
	 According to Lin, the central concern of Putnam’s, Coleman’s, and 
Bourdieu’s social capitalism is to explore the elements and processes involved in 
the production and maintenance of collective assets (Lin, 2001, p. 22).
	 Defining social capital as capital consisting of “resources embedded in one’s 
network or associations” (Lin, 2001, p. 56), Lin focuses on the potential effective-
ness of a person with resources who is accessible through direct and indirect 
ties.  Individuals invest in “social relations with expected returns” in the mar-
ketplace (economic market, political market, labor market, or community) (Lin, 
2001, p. 19).
	 Let’s look at Lin’s empirical data.  His Albany (NY) research showed that 
contact status in the job search was affected by “parental statuses (ascribed 
status), education, network resources, and weaker ties with the contact” (Lin, 
2001, p. 93).  “The strength of weak ties” hypothesis was demonstrated by 
seminal research carried out by Mark S. Granovetter, who studied job changes 
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by PTM workers (professional, technical, and managerial workers) living in 
Newton (near Boston) (Granovetter, 1974).
	 For Latin American in the late 1960s, most migration of rural people to 
large cities resulted in the emergence of huge shanty towns surrounding the 
cities. A disastrous condition caused by “urbanization without industrialization,” 
this necessitated most of these people to take marginal jobs.  Wayne Cornelius 
(1975, p. 22) reported that upon arrival in Mexico City, most migrants were suc-
cessful in finding employment and increasing their incomes through “strong 
ties,” such as friends and kinsfolk, who were on hand.  Only 4 percent remained 
unemployed for more than 6 months.  Forty-three percent of the migrants re-
ported having no difficulty finding their first job, another 42 percent recalled 
that they had had “only a little” difficulty.
	 Migrants coming from rural areas to Mexico City got menial jobs through 
“strong ties.”  By contrast, getting information concerning corporate promises, 
gaining opportunities for developing skills and the expectations of promotion 
through “weak ties” is important to facilitate joining the family of “winners” for 
PTM workers in Newton, the setting of Getting A Job, and for IT technologists 
in networking industrial cluster areas (e.g., Silicon Valley).  An extension of the 
market fostered by the concentration of many forms of resources in today’s big 
cities, and by economic globalization, might require social capital created by “a 
network in which people can broker connections between otherwise disconnect-
ed segments” (Burt, 2001, p. 31. See also Burt, 1992).
	 According to Robert B. Reich, former Secretary of Labor in the Clinton 
Administration, since the early 1970s the American economy has been divided 
into the following three job-categories: decreasing “routine production servic-
es”; increasing low-paying “in-personal services”; a handful of high-paying 
“symbolic analytic services” including all problem-solving, problem-identifying, 
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and strategic-brokering activities (Reich, 1991). 
	 “Symbolic analysts,” making efficient use of brokerage-type social capital, 
jet around the world to business meetings.  “Another image of the visible and 
invisible worlds beneath our noses is suggested by a flight along the northeast 
corridor from Boston to Washington.  In the morning, on the flight south, the 
structures and fixed patterns of the industrial world fill the window: roads, 
buildings, football fields, water towers.  On the trip north, at night, a wondrous 
transformation has occurred.  There are no asphalt parking lots, no brick-and–
mortal factories, nor geometrically plowed fields.  Instead there are ribbons and 
clusters of light, myriad faint pinpricks in dark spaces between great shimmer-
ing seas of urban brilliance ―  a reality completely invisible to the daytime 
traveler” (Lipnack and Stamps, 1982, p. 229).
	 By contrast, there are a large number of people who can’t jet around even 
if they work at an airport “Terminal,” a typical “non-place.”  We can easily see 
the ground battered by poverty where there are no ribbons of lights in the 
night. As an aside, it is worth noting that the above-quoted passage is a very 
impressive description of the research done on the actual conditions of new citi-
zens’ participation in the initial stages of computer-networking.  Jessica Lip-
nack and Jeffrey Stamps, the authors of the aforementioned passage, under-
stand that the meaning of networks is bound up in relations: the links, 
connections, communications, friendships, trusts, and values that give the net-
work its life.
	 With networks, in contrast to hierarchies, power tends to become dispersed 
into plural nodes and links. “Instead of being held together within a boundary, 
a network coheres from shared values, interests, goals, and objectives” (Lipnack 
and Stamps, 1982, p. 230).  A network as a whole treats its participants with 
respect, each voice expecting to be treated equally.  Behind the formation of 
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networks lies the Internet which galvanizes the activity of NPOs or NGOs, tack-
ling problems of poverty and human rights.
	 In contrast to the poor who cannot fly even coach class, PTM workers con-
tributing to some NPOs / NGOs “live and work among themselves, crowded in 
or near metropolitan centers.  They jet around the world to business meetings 
or conferences and hop on planes again to ‘escape’ for vacations at luxurious 
retreats or exotic sites” (Skocpol, 2003, p. 213).
	 While the rapid globalization of the economic web in Asia has recently cre-
ated a network effect by concentrating high-value-added activities into specific 
areas, the gap between the center of the global economy and its circumference 
has rapidly widen.  Hordes of “data processors stationed in ‘back offices’ at 
computer terminals linked to world-wide information banks” (Reich, 1991, p. 
175) are forced to find insecure positions in a borderless-economy.  For them, 
the workplace is a “non-place,” as described by the French anthropologist Marc 
Augé: a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned 
with identity, if a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned 
with identity (Augé, 1995, p. 77-78). An “Anthropological place,” which Augé 
takes pleasure in contrasting with a “non-place,” might be towns and villages in 
contemporary provincial France.
3　Trust
“Conjoint” Authority Relations and Trust
	 Small-firm industrial districts with concentrated social capital in the center 
and north of Italy are like “anthropological places.”  Applying Granovetter’s 
“strength of weak ties” to civic society, Putnam identified a source of vitality for 
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democracy in trust and civic engagement fostered by horizontal “weak ties.” 
Trust is generated and malfeasance discouraged when agreements are “embed-
ded” within large structures of personal relations or social networks (Granovet-
ter, 1985, p. 490).  According to Putnam, such trust facilitates flows of informa-
tion about “technological developments, about the creditworthiness of would-be 
entrepreneurs, about the reliability of individual workers” (Putnam, 1993a, p. 
161) and creates lively small/medium-scale industrial districts.
	 A structure of “governance by trust” based on “weak ties” supporting in-
ter-firm networks (Wakabayashi, 2002, pp. 220-223) generates a durable, recip-
rocal and diffused obligatory commitment, unlike “contracts” in market transac-
tions which result in a drain on resources and a “weakness of strong ties” 
accompanied by dyadic direct exchanges.
	 According to Coleman, “an actor makes a unilateral transfer of control over 
certain resources to another actor, based on a hope or expectation that the 
other’s actions will satisfy his interests better than would his own actions; yet he 
can only be certain at some time after he has made the transfer” (Coleman, 
1990, p. 91).  Differing from instantaneous exchanges among equals, such as 
market transactions, “trust” is generated through such a transfer of control over 
one’s resources to others.
	 After carefully considering the traits of “trust,” Coleman contrasts com-
munes and trade unions with bureaucratic organizations and agency relations. 
The latter are called “disjointed” authority relations in which a transfer of the 
rights of control is made in exchange for payment of a wage or salary.  By con-
trast, the former are called “conjoined” authority systems in which actors trans-
fer authority without receiving an extrinsic type of payment.  “This is a subjec-
tively rational transfer of authority when it is based on the belief that the 
exercise of the authority will be in the actors’ interests” (Coleman, 1990, p. 73). 
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Using Graziano’s terms, communes and class-based trade unions, among “con-
joined” types, could correspond to “ideology” and voluntary associations. Prag-
matic political parties belong to “indirect exchange” while the former might 
correspond to “economic exchange.”  That is to say, a “civic” community will be 
facilitated by trust developed by “conjoined” authority relations through indirect 
exchange.  The transfer of control over one’s actions in conjoint authority rela-
tions “must occur at some time before the expected benefits can be realized” 
(Coleman, 1990, p. 91). 
Trust and the Logic of Confidence
	 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, in their influential article “The Structure 
of Educational Organization” (Meyer and Rowan, 1978), clearly show that the 
“logic of confidence” is keeping school organizations alive by “decoupling” for-
mal and “tight controls” (formal qualification/classification 〔“ritual classifica-
tion”〕） from “loose controls” (noncommittal coordination of instructional activi-
ties/methods).  In the organization of schooling, “rules are often violated, 
decisions are often unimplemented, or if implemented have uncertain conse-
quences, technologies are of problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspec-
tion systems are subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little coordina-
tion” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 343).
	 Karl E. Weick (1982) likewise characterizes school systems as “loosely 
coupled” rather than centralized bureaucracies.  School board members, super-
intendents, central staff, principals and teachers have different roles and re-
spond to different incentives.  Relationships among them tend to be “unpredict-
able, weak and intermittent.”  “Myths, rituals, and symbols” embedded in such 
a loosely coupled system as this type of institution, could operate as “the logic 
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of confidence,” make school organizations legally effective and legitimize the 
demands of organizations for resources, as well as legitimize their efforts to 
survive “loosely coupled” systems in which a collection of actors operate in a 
“semiautonomous manner.”
	 Like Meyer’s thesis of indigenization of schools through “decoupling,” 
“politics” has to attain  its actual implementation of goal-setting, make decisions 
about prioritizing policy and settle conflicts within a loosely-coupled system that 
arise from balancing “tight control” (political institutions and structures) with 
“loose control” (ambiguous control over contents and procedures of individual 
policies).  In such circumstances, the political “logic of confidence,” differing 
from an accumulative study of socially generalized trust and interpersonal trust, 
and from simple transfers of social trust to the political domain, operates 
through “disjointed” authority relations generated by the transfer of control 
over one’s action to an agent (bureaucrat or politician).
	 In politics, a principal is more distant from an agent than in schools and 
knowledge, and the information dominating both actors, is used more for “me-
diating.” The transfer of the right to control one’s own resources will seem all 
the more like “leaping into the dark.”  As Coleman shrewdly commented, “the 
structure of authority for a New Yorker’s political beliefs may involve a partial 
transfer to the New York Times, the New Yorker, and the New York Review of 
Books” (Coleman, 1990, p. 86).
Logic of Confidence and Operative Ideals
	 Since information and knowledge about “politics” is always “intermediary,” 
the media always intrudes on the political “logic of confidence,” and threatens it. 
Even in such circumstances, according to J. W. Meyer et al., the nation state, 
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which needs to rationalize itself and prove it is “appropriate” and “responsible,” 
might be continuously exposed to practices of ritual self-expressive (Meyer, 
Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997).
	 As an “operative ideal” infused with “myths, rituals, and symbols” that has 
already been prepared for the public sphere, political culture, over which the 
state and civic society (including the media) compete for influence, organizes the 
political judgment, attitude, and the behavior of citizens.  It could also limit the 
range of political discourse and set the stage for “legitimate” political action.
	 Robert Putnam’s earlier work, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, 
and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) 
investigated how British and Italian politicians conceived Democracy.  The “op-
eratives of ideals” of DEMOCRACY they used are as follows: (1) classical de-
mocracy (“government by the people”); (2) liberal democracy (“government by 
parliament”); (3) polyarchal democracy (“government by party leaders”); (4) 
authoritarian democracy (“the accentuation of the role of political leaders and 
diminution of the role of followers”); and (5) socioeconomic democracy (“the ac-
centuation of socioeconomic equality”). 
	 In Britain, “polyarchal” and “liberal” interpretations of democracy are by 
far the most frequent and there is an even stronger consensus against any of the 
other three concepts.  Most of all, British politicians consider DEMOCRACY as 
a competition among political parties seeking to form a government in parlia-
ment.  In Italy, by contrast, the most common model is classical democracy. 
The next most frequently mentioned model is “socioeconomic” democracy, but 
there are also significant numbers of “authoritarian” democrats.  The Italian 
politician is likely to interpret DEMOCRACY from the point of view of “equal-
ity,” “fairness,” and “freedom.”  Fifty-two percent of all Italians are either 
“authoritarian” democrats or “classical” democrats; the figure for Britain is 10 
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percent (Putnam, 1973, p. 183).
	 Junichi Kawata did research similar to Putnam (1973) with the subjects of 
investigation being children in Britain and America3.  To find out how “future 
citizens” in each country develop a cognitive endorsement of DEMOCRACY, 
Kawata used the written questionnaire, “What is the best way of describing 
DEMOCRACY?  Please check one of the following”: 
(1) Where everyone can have a say about what the government does.― po-
litical “freedom”; 
(2) Where everyone is treated the same socially and economically.― socio-
economic “equality”; 
(3) Where there are no bosses to tell people what to do.― government by 
the people; 
(4) Where everyone can vote.― political “equality”; and 
(5) Where everyone can get a good job and make money.― socioeconomic 
“freedom”.
The response rate of each item was as follows: 
(1) Britain (44.7%), America (51.4%); (2) Britain (22.5%), America (17.9%); (3) 
Britain (5.6%), America (5.7%); (4) Britain (19.4%), America (14.5%); (5) Britain 
(7.8%), America (10.5%) (The following figures from (1) to (5) give itemized an-
swers to the above-mentioned questions).  
	 In American, the percentage of children who chose “political freedom” sur-
passed that for those who chose “socioeconomic equality”: 
(1) 18.9% (9-12 years old) → 35.3% (13-15 years old) → 53.0% (16 years old 
and over); 
(2) 24.4% (9-12 years old) → 17.5% (13-15 years old) →11.9% (16 years old 
and over).  
“Liberty” becomes the dominant “operative ideal” for DEMOCRACY.  
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	 The British respondents scored 52.5% for FREEDOM (combining the (1)-
and-(5) ratio), and 41.9% for EQUALITY (combining the (2)-and-(4) percent-
age).  For the American respondents, the comparable figures were 61.9% for 
FREEDOM, and 32.4% for EQUARITY.
	 Kawata’s data seems to allow us to assume that the future citizens of the 
United States will develop “the concept of ‘liberal’ democracy, stressing limited 
government with political freedom, and ‘polyarchal’ democracy (in a sort of 
Schmpeterian model of democracy stressing government by political leaders) 
rather than that of ‘socioeconomic’ democracy stressing social and economic 
equality” (Kawata, 1986, pp. 457-458).  The significance of his conclusion drawn 
from comparable data in two countries could be highlighted by Banfield’s obser-
vation that the “British still believe that the government should govern.  And we 
(American) still believe that everyone has a right to ‘get in the act’ and make his 
influence felt” (Banfield, 1960, p. 67).
Trust in Pluralization
	 According to Senghaas, where social mobility and political awareness and 
involvement are allowed, and plurality is no longer a novel, elitist phenomenon 
but instead has turned into the mass phenomenon of divided and riven societies, 
“one is forced to consider the question of coexistence.” Senghaas asked how it is 
possible, under such circumstances, “to establish modalities for the constructive 
management of conflict which, despite the existing plurality, allow for reliable, 
non-violent agreements in the public arena?”  In posing this serious question, 
he has to take into account his own realization that, “unhindered pluralism with-
out institutional safeguards, that is, without a recognized and accepted legal 
framework, can mean civil war” (Senghaas, 2002, p. 116).
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	 According to Douglas W. Rae and Michael J. Taylor, the stability of the 
polity depends on the degree of fragmentation and cross-cutting formed by 
cleavages that fall into three general classes: (1) non-scripted or “trait” cleav-
ages such as race or caste; (2) attitudinal or “opinion” cleavages such as ideol-
ogy or, less grandly, preferential; and, (3) behavioral or “action” cleavages such 
as those elicited through voting and organizational membership (Rae and Tay-
lor, 1970, p. 1).
	 They make a summary of conventional explanations of democratic stability. 
There are two types.  The first one, stressing factor (2), is a group of “consensus 
theories,” which seek to account for the viability of democracies, either in terms 
of an underlying consensus on fundamental democratic principles in a society, or 
in terms of patterns of “differentiated agreement.”  Second, there are various 
“social pluralism” arguments.  They, focusing on factor (1), insist that “too much 
homogeneity” as well as “too much heterogeneity” resulting from social cleav-
ages, is detrimental to a stable democracy.  Rae and Taylor critically observed 
that these theories are not focused upon “the relations between these cleavages, 
but rather upon the fragmentation produced by each cleavage separately.” In 
spite of their concern about the effects of several cleavages (Rae and Taylor, 
1970, p. 85), they proposed the idea of “cross-cutting” (XC) to indicate the rela-
tions between cleavages, i.e. fragmentations, and presented Figure Ⅷ-2.  Rae 
and Taylor assume that F (fragmentation) is used as the measure of heterogene-
ity in arguments on social pluralism; and they simplify the problem by restrict-
ing attention to two cleavages, X1 and X2.  F1 and F2 are associated with X1 
and X2 respectively.  They then propose the following hypothesis: (1) “If both 
F1 and F2 are either too low or too high, then democratic political organization 
is not likely to be stable”; and (2) “If the value of XC is too low, then demo-
cratic political organization is not likely to be stable.” XC means the amount of 
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cross-cutting between two cleavages (F1 and F2).  According to Rae and Taylor, 
“If there is not sufficient cross-cutting between politically relevant cleavages, 
then democratic political organization is not likely to be stable” (Rae and Taylor, 
1970, p. 106).
1.0 
0                                         1.0 
Note: XC = (1-F1) + (1-F2) - 2(1- Fc ) (4)
Too homogeneous 
(F1 and F2 too low)  
Too heterogeneous 
(F1and F2 too high)
       max  XC 
              Possible stable 
   democracies 
Figure Ⅷ-2　The	Relation	between	Social	Pluralism		and	Cross-Cutting
Note: XC = (1-F1) + (1-F2) - 2(1- Fc ) 4
（227）
Ⅷ　Social Capital, Trust, and Democracy
Table Ⅷ-1　DEMOCRACY	and	Race（USA）
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) TOTAL
White 0.401 0.109 0.027 0.106 0.048 0.690
Black 0.059 0.049 0.022 0.017 0.052 0.200
Oriental 0.025 0.007 0.003 0.013 0 0.048
Indian 0.003 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.006
Others 0.027 0.013 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.056
TOTAL 0.515 0.179 0.056 0.145 0.104 1
Note: (1)-(5) shows the best way of describing DEMOCRACY.
Table Ⅷ-2　DEMOCRACY	and	Party	Support（UK）
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) TOTAL
Cons. 0.122 0.053 0.017 0.057 0.015 0.264
Labour 0.172 0.091 0.024 0.065 0.035 0.387
Liberal 0.023 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.038
Soc.	Dem. 0.014 0.009 0 0.012 0.002 0.037
Others 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.029
DK 0.107 0.069 0.009 0.042 0.020 0.247
TOTAL 0.446 0.226 0.056 0.194 0.078 1
Note: (1)-(5) shows the best way of describing DEMOCRACY.
	 Table Ⅷ-1 and Ⅷ-2 show the fragmentation and cross-cutting of DEMOC-
RACY, with Race included in the American sample, and Party Support in the 
British one.
	 In America, F1 was 0.667757, F2 was 0.478424, FC was 0.80201, and XC 
was 0.457839.  In Britain, F1 was 0.695468, F2 was 0.688608, FC was 0.923135, 
and XC was 0.462194.  These figures for both America and Britain fit into the 
framework of “possible stable democracies.”
	 Senghaas (2002) and Rae and Taylor (1970) emphasize “consensus” in plural 
societies.  With that in mind, we may provide Robert Dahl’s following linking 
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argument.  “The extent of agreement must be functionally dependent upon the 
extent to which the various processes for social training are employed on behalf 
of the norms by the family, schools, churches, clubs, literature, newspaper, and 
the like….The extent of agreement (consensus)….increases with the extent of 
social training in the norm.  Consensus is therefore a function of total social 
training in all the norms” (Dahl, 1956, p. 76).
	 According to Theda Skocpol, chamber-based federated associations that 
recruit members from across class divisions, as well as occupations, foster social 
training in the United States (Skocpol, 2003).  American civic society has been 
nurtured by voluntary associations based on relations within “conjoined” au-
thorities.  With the help of locally-federated political structures whose authority 
relations are similar to voluntary associations, there has been a commitment to 
political consensus-building by putting in place political societies consisting of 
competitive political parties, interest groups and “disjointed”-type federal gov-
ernments (=state organizations).  Robert Putnam, holding such a perspective in 
common with Skocpol, recognized the vicious aspects of “bonding social capital” 
which demands strong loyalty within the association and hampers the revitaliza-
tion of civic society. Putnam recognized that this had a dysfunctional influence 
over American democracy (Putnam, 1993b).
	 On the other hand, European politics and societies which are easily influ-
enced by social pluralism, have mitigated political conflicts by building political 
architectures based upon “the guarantee of minority rights, through the status 
of autonomy or consociational arrangements, that is one variety or another of 
consensual democracy” (Senghaas, 2002, p. 101).
	 But trust is “a sort of belief.”  So, even when appropriate institutions, such 
as federal representative systems or consociational democratic systems, “are in 
place to enable people to cooperate, they may not do so”（Dasgupta, 2007, p. 
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44).  In a society where the degree of XC is too low, “indirect exchange”, as 
termed by Graziano, does not function well, and “too low trust” takes the form 
of “alienated” distrust.  Such a situation may lead to the destruction of “tight 
control” or “may make political activity seem pointless.”  By contrast, “too high 
may make it seem unnecessary” (Centre for Educational Research and Innova-
tion, 2007, p. 80).
Conclusion
Examining the concepts of social capital and trust, we saw how individuals or 
groups embedded in social networks, institutions, or political cultures could form 
mutual cooperation and consensus through indirect exchanges of their individu-
alized interests.
	 Robert Putnam tried to expand the possible range of cooperation and con-
sensus by a revitalization of the “bridging” of social capital.  But, even if the 
endless work of linking one “bridging” capital with another one can generate 
norms of cooperation, strong social solidarity and high levels of trust, we have 
also confirmed that the logic suggests this would not necessarily work well in 
the world of politics.  Because, borrowing Bourdieu’s theoretical position which 
views social capital as class reproduction, “le champ politique” is a game that 
involves “the struggles for the monopoly of a legitimate principle of vision and 
of a division of the social world” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 64. Translated by the au-
thor.).  In all cases, either too high or too low, trust will not necessarily revital-
ize political activities.
	 In many Asian countries, the swift progress of democracy has raised hopes 
for a “generalized rule” referred to in the head epigram.  Many scholars and 
activists expect to observe the effects of “bonding” social capital, which 
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“conjoined”-type organizations like the NGO, NPO, People’s Organizations or 
Grass-root Organizations (might) produce. 
	 But, under an authority structure with low legitimacy where the functions 
of control and supervision are inefficient or corrupt, where obtaining resources 
is mired in incoherent taxation and enforcement measures, and where the link-
ages or challenges from government to the rest of society are based on informal, 
personal, or clientele criteria (Diaz-Albertini, 1993, p. 321), we cannot forget 
that in a repressive context, NPOs may “provide the only safe political space 
within which to oppose a regime” (Fisher, 1993, pp. 77-78). 
	 Although Junichi Kawata did research in America and Britain to find out 
how “future citizens” develop a cognitive endorsement of DEMOCRACY, is it 
possible, and significant, to do a similar research on political socialization based 
on “primacy principles” and “structuring principles” functioning in stable de-
mocracies in Asian countries?  It seems to me that this point is very important 
when we think about the democratization theory.
	 Now, the thesis of “social capital” has often been criticized for giving too low 
a priority to “cognition,” although it is considered significant for its grasp of 
norms or trust.  Environments surrounding cooperative behavior orienting from 
“consensus” become more and more uncertain, especially in Asian countries, 
through economic globalization, “supercapitalism” (Reich, 2007) which unifies 
industries with finances, and cyber-politicization.
（231）
Ⅷ　Social Capital, Trust, and Democracy
Figure Ⅷ-3  Social Capital, Trust, and Democracy
	 In such a circumstance, it seems to be important for the argument about 
“Democracy and Trust in Asia” that theories of social capital and trust must be 
connected to the evolutionary theory of trust,5 and must attach importance to 
the agency’s “cognitive” process in the theory of social exchange elaborated on 
by Luigi Graziano.  Figure Ⅷ-3 gives an experimental and preparatory figure 
for such a future work.
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NOTES
1.		 Some	provincial	 leaders	have	been	 slow	 to	 throw	 their	 support	behind	village-level	
balloting.	As	Kevin	J.	O’Brien	 (O’Brien,	2004,	 p.	113)	notes,	 elections	 in	 large	parts	of	
Guangdong,	Yunnan,	Guangxi	 and	Hainan	only	began	 in	 the	 late	1990s,	 a	decade	or	more	
after	the	original	Organic	Law	was	passed.
2.		 As	for	organizations	and	movements	in	Asian	civil	societies,	see	Alagappa,	2004.
3.		 In	America,	 I	obtained	 the	data	 in	a	survey	of	835	 fifth	 through	 twelfth	grade	children,	
conducted	 from	May	 to	October,	1980,	 in	 selected	 classes	of	 seven	 schools	 in	New	Haven	
(CT)	and	in	two	areas	surrounding	Stanford	University	(CA).		In	Britain,	data	in	a	survey	of	
717	was	 collected	 from	September	 to	October,	1984,	 in	 selected	 classes	of	 two	 secondary	
middle	 schools	 in	Birmingham.	 	Kawata	 studied	 the	 scheme	 of	 their	 psychological	
organization	and	the	modality	of	their	acquisition	and	selection	via	the	analysis	of	American	
and	British	 children’s	 responses	 to	 fifty	words:	 community-related	words	 like	equality,	
liberty,	nation;	political	 regime/institution-related	words	 like	democracy,	 election,	 voting;	
partisan	words	 like	extremist,	Democrat	 (Labour);	national/international-dimension	words	
like	army,	peace;	words	which	do	not	necessarily	have	political	 connotation	 like	discussion,	
prestige;	socio-economic	words	 like	money,	poverty,	strike.	 	From	the	analysis	of	cognitive	
and	affective	configurations	of	the	American	sample,	Kawata	found	that	the	American	child	
begins	 to	know	 the	 concept	of	“equality”	 later	 than	 that	of	“ liberty”	 and	 its	 correlation	
coefficients	with	“America,”	“nation,”	and	“national	 flag”	are	not	so	high	as	 in	the	case	of	
“ liberty”	(	Kawata,	1986,	p.	250).		EQUALITY	has	an	ambivalent	and	controversial	value	in	
America.		It	is	in	line	with	common	wisdom	about	American	fundamental	values.		An	analysis	
of	Kawata’s	British	data	has	not	been	published	yet.		I	gratefully	acknowledge	many	helpful	
comments	on	this	research	by	Professor	Richard	M.	Merelman,	the	Department	of	Political	
Science,	the	University	of	Wisconsin,	Madison,	USA,	the	late	professor	Robert	D.	Hess,	the	
Graduate	School	 of	Education,	Stanford	University,	USA,	and,	Professor	Bob	Jessop,	 the	
Department	of	Government,	the	University	of	Essex,	Colchester,	UK	(now	the	University	of	
Lancaster).
4.		 XC	is	defined	as	the	proportion	of	all	pairs	of	individuals	where	both	members	are	in	the	
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same	group	 of	 one	 cleavage	but	 in	 different	 groups	 of	 the	 other	 cleavage.	 	F1	 is	 the	
fragmentation	of	cleavage	X1.		F2	is	the	fragmentation	of	cleavage	X2.		Fc	is	the	probability	
that	any	two	individuals	are	in	different	“cells”	of	the	contingency	table.		When	the	number	
of	items	in	X1	row	is	i	and	the	number	of	items	in	X2	column	is	j,	F1	equals	1-Σ
n		1
i=
1
Pi2	,	F2	equals	
1-Σ
n		2
j=1
Pj2	,	and		
	 Fc	equals	1-Σ
n		1
i=
1		
		Σ
n		2
j=1
Pij.
	 See	Rae	and	Taylor,	1970,	pp.	90-97.
5.		 Masao	Aoki’s	thesis	on	the	“co-evolution	of	belief	systems	and	institutions”	seems	to	me	
very	suggestive.	See	Aoki,	2008.
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